Introduction
It is generally accepted that the favorable tax subsidy to homeownership in the United States stimulates the demand for housing, raising prices and increasing the homeownership rate. 1 That this subsidy comes at a significant cost is also well documented at the national level, with a number of authors having estimated the tax expenditure associated with the mortgage interest and property tax deductions as well as the untaxed return on housing equity. Over time, these marginal incentives for homeownership -and the aggregate cost of those subsidies -have changed considerably. For example, Poterba's (1992) analysis of the impacts of the various tax reforms of the 1980s reports a significant increase in the marginal cost of owner-occupied housing between 1980 and 1990 across the income distribution, but particularly for high income owners, due in large part to a drop in marginal tax rates for high income households and an overall reduction in the progressivity of the tax code. In our work below, we calculate that the real cost of the tax subsidy to homeownership has risen substantially in the last 20 years, from $198 billion (in 1999 dollars) in 1979, to $284 billion in 1989, and $420 billion in 1999. In addition, recent evidence shows that the value of the subsidy to owner-occupied housing varies dramatically over space. Gyourko and Sinai (2003) , using 1990 Census data, find that the benefits of the tax subsidy are highly skewed with just a handful of metropolitan areas reaping most of the net gains from the favored tax treatment of owner-occupiers.
These sets of stylized facts naturally lead one to wonder whether the changes over time in marginal incentives for homeownership and in the aggregate cost of the homeownership subsidy 1 See Rosen (1989) for a classic analysis and Bruce and Holtz-Eakin (1999) , Capozza, Green, and Hendershott (1996) , and the report to the Ford Foundation by Green and Reschovsky (2001) for more recent investigations into how the tax code might function in these regards. 2 For example, see Follain and Ling (1991) and Follain, Ling, and McGill (1998). have also affected the geographic distribution of the benefits. Because housing markets are inextricably tied to a physical location, and are not national in scope, knowing the extent to which the tax benefits vary spatially is important for determining the potential impact of any change in the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing. Moreover, the nature of the spatial distribution of benefit flows is likely to be important for any consideration of the potential impacts on house prices, the homeownership rate, or the political economy of fundamental tax reform.
In addition, knowledge of how the geographical distribution of program benefits changes also is useful for analysis of the spatial equity of the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing.
For example, every year the Tax Foundation calculates each state's ratio of federal spending received to taxes paid, and finds substantial variation across states. Our results, that the benefits of the subsidy to owner-occupied housing vary spatially, suggest that this sort of calculation should include implicit tax expenditures and subsidies alongside the observable taxes and spending. Indeed, many of the Tax Foundation's states with the lowest ratios of spending to actual taxes paid are the same ones whose home owners receive the largest housing-related subsidies.
In this paper, we examine how the spatial distribution of the tax subsidy to owneroccupied housing changes over three decades. Using the 1980 , 1990 , and 2000 calculate the value of the tax subsidy to owner-occupied housing as the difference in ordinary state and federal income taxes currently paid by home owners and the taxes they would pay if the tax code treated them like landlords. In the latter scenario, there is no preference for investing in one's home relative to other assets.
Interestingly, while we find that the marginal tax subsidy for homeownership has decreased over the last 20 years on net, the aggregate value of the tax benefits actually increased.
Our analysis indicates that this is due to rising house prices and growth in the number of homeowners more than offsetting the decline in average tax benefit per dollar of house. In particular, the after-tax cost of a dollar of owner-occupied housing rose between 1979 and 1989 before falling slightly by 1999, as the marginal tax rates on housing deductions were reduced and then increased. All else constant, one would expect the value of the tax benefit to fall with tax rates. However, this is not the case at the per-owner level, where the benefit remained flat during the 1980s before rising by 20 percent during the 1990s. The fact that the aggregate subsidy rose substantially during the 1980s, from $198 billion in 1979 to $284 billion in 1989, is due at least in part to growth in the number of homeowners.
In regard to the spatial distribution of the subsidy, these tax changes, increases in house prices, and growth in the number of homeowners were not individually neutral. However, they happen to offset each other so that at the state level the spatial distribution of the tax benefits changes little over time. At the metropolitan area level, however, spatial skewness of the subsidy has been increasing. This phenomenon appears to driven by the relatively large house price increases experienced in various coastal areas of California and in the Northeast between New York City and Boston. Even so, the top recipients tend to persist; they just receive a larger fraction of the total subsidy over time.
Among states, California always receives the largest gross subsidy flow, but this is not due solely to the fact that it has the most owners. For example, in 2000 it received 18.7 percent of the aggregate subsidy while having only 9.4 percent of the nation's owners. That high ratio of benefits to owners applies to only a very small number of other states such as New York (9.5 percent of total benefit flow while being home to only 5.3 percent of the nation's owners in 2000), indicating that this program has highly spatially targeted beneficiaries. This pattern of spatial skewness to where program benefits flow is even more extreme at the metropolitan area level. Comparing subsidy flows in 1979 in the top 20 areas versus those in the bottom 20 areas finds that owners in the high recipient areas received from 2.7 to 8.0 times the subsidy reaped per owner in the bottom group. By 1999, the analogous calculation finds the typical owner in the top twenty areas receiving from 3.4 to 17.1 times more benefits than owners in any of the 20 lowest recipient areas.
The precise economic implications of these results depend upon whether or not the subsidy is capitalized into land prices. While such an analysis is well beyond the scope of this paper, the broad range of possible outcomes can be readily understood. If the subsidy were fully capitalized, eliminating it would not affect the user cost of owning but many owners in a few metropolitan areas would experience significant changes in wealth. While the savings associated with eliminating the subsidy would be redistributed back to homeowners, the net wealth effect still could be significant in many areas regardless of how one thinks the tax benefits are financed. If the tax subsidy is not capitalized into land prices, then the user cost of ownership must reflect it.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the first section, we describe the tax subsidy to owner-occupied housing and how we measure it. Section two reports our results, beginning with an analysis of how benefits flow across states and followed by a description of the distribution across metropolitan areas. Finally, there is a brief conclusion and summary.
I. Measuring Housing-Related Tax Benefits
The fact that there is a subsidy to owner-occupied housing can most easily be seen by comparing the current tax treatment of home owners to how they would be taxed if housing were treated like any other asset. In particular, owner-occupied housing gets favorable tax treatment, but housing owned by a landlord is treated like any other income-producing, depreciable asset.
Both homeowners and landlords are allowed to deduct mortgage interest and property taxes as expenses (as long as the homeowner itemizes). But a landlord must pay tax on her rental income while a homeowner does not. The homeowner implicitly pays herself rent to occupy her house, but because she is both landlord and tenant, that transfer is tax-free whereas if the parties were distinct, the rent would be taxed. On the other hand, landlords can deduct depreciation and maintenance, while homeowners cannot.
It is apparent from this comparison that the tax subsidy to owner-occupancy arises largely from the non-taxation of the implicit rent on the home. However, it is not so straightforward to compute the amount of the benefit. Implicit rent is unobserved and the components of landlords' tax bills are often difficult to estimate. Instead, as we show below, it is much more straightforward to calculate the difference between the equilibrium taxes paid by homeowners and landlords. Underlying this approach is the same assumption used in the familiar user cost of owning concept developed in Hendershott and Slemrod (1983) and Poterba (1984) : the marginal home owner invests in owner-occupied housing until the point where the annual cost she incurs exactly equals the rent she would have to pay as a tenant in the same property.
We begin with the equilibrium annual flow cost of owning. That user cost is described in equation (1) and takes into account the fact that implicit rental income is untaxed while mortgage interest and property taxes are deductible for itemizers:
The left-hand side variable, R H , is the annual cost of owner occupancy per dollar of housing value. These costs include: (a) the after-tax cost of mortgage interest, (1-τ ded )αi, where α is the loan-to-value ratio on the house, i is the mortgage interest rate, and τ ded is the owner-occupier's marginal tax rate, equal to her marginal rate (denoted τ int ) if she itemizes and zero otherwise; (b) the after-tax cost of property tax payments, (1-τ ded )τ p , with τ p the effective property tax rate; (c) the after-tax opportunity cost of investing equity in the house rather than in some other riskless investment at rate of return, r; this is given by (1-τ int )(1-α)r and is a cost to all owners, whether they itemize or not; 3 (d) an after-tax risk premium, (1-τ int )β, to account for the difference in risk between bonds and housing; this applies to the entire long position in the house and thus is unaffected by the choice of leverage; 4 (e) annual maintenance costs per unit of housing which are given by M; (f) the cost of true economic depreciation per unit of house which is assumed to occur at rate δ; and (g) any annual appreciation in the house value, Π H , which reduces the carrying cost.
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If the home owner were treated as a landlord, the residence would be taxed just like any other asset. Neutral tax treatment obviously requires taxing the implicit rental income on the home, but if treated like landlords, owner occupiers also would be able to deduct maintenance 3 Implicitly, we assume that the opportunity cost of tying up equity in a house is foregoing taxable returns. If the home owner were to invest in a tax-exempt asset instead, we assume the return would be (1-τ)r rather than r, yielding the same after-tax return. 4 In this framework, the homeowner's financial position can be thought of as being long one house and short one bond (the mortgage). This allows us to decompose the opportunity cost of being long the house as the riskless rate of return plus a premium that reflects the difference in risk between a bond position and an equivalent risk alternative to investing in housing. The difference between the mortgage interest rate and the equivalent duration riskless rate is reflected in the options to default on or prepay the mortgage. These options have value to the owner, so the premium above the riskless rate for borrowing is rolled into the mortgage rate as a cost. 5 This specification treats capital gains on housing as untaxed and realized every year. Given that there now is a $250,000 capital gains exclusion ($500,000 for married couples filing jointly) that can be applied every other year, this is not unrealistic. Even in earlier periods, the assumption of no capital gains taxation on housing was valid for the vast majority of households.
expenses and depreciation, not just the mortgage interest and local property taxes presently allowed. In this case, a different annual cost would result, as described in equation (2):
With perfect competition in the rental housing market, rents must equal the annual cost, so τR H '
would be the tax due on imputed rent. 6 Grouping the R H ' terms and dividing both sides by (1-τ) yields the simplified version in equation (3)
One possible strategy to estimate the tax benefits of owner-occupancy would be to compute R H ′ as the sum of the terms of on the right-hand side of equation (3), add that value to the homeowner's reported income, and then determine the additional tax that would be paid.
There are two important drawbacks to that approach. One is that we do not have good data on maintenance, depreciation, or expected capital gains, so the estimate is likely to be a noisy one.
The other is that simply adding the implicit rent to income does not accurately capture the impact of itemization rates because the tax rates on deductions differ for non-itemizers.
The alternative strategy we pursue in this paper is to compute the difference between R H ' and R H directly by subtracting equation (1) from (3). Doing so yields the following:
This also assumes accrual taxation of capital gains which, when combined with statutory ordinary income and capital gains rates being equal, allows us to focus on program benefits arising from differential tax treatment of ordinary income. As our 2003 paper shows, in this setting a dollar of house price appreciation has approximately the same value to owner-occupiers and landlords, so there is no differential impact on user costs. The analysis behind this conclusion is fairly complex, and we refer the interested reader to that paper for the details. 7 Note that we have abstracted throughout from how many housing dollars on which a home owning family receives a subsidy. A change in the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing might affect house values, but because we measure the subsidy on a per dollar basis, we abstract from the possibility that there is a second order effect through changes in house prices. This is done for two reasons. First, determining precisely how a change in the subsidy would be capitalized into house values is beyond the scope of this paper. Second, any change in house price would only increase the magnitudes of our estimates. For example, if the benefit to owner-occupied housing were reduced, Not only does this approach get the impact of itemization correctly, but the terms for which we would have the most problems measuring accurately (M, δ, and П) difference out in the subtraction. Thus, the tax subsidy to owner-occupancy can be computed as the sum of three components: (a) the tax value of home mortgage interest deductions (τ ded ⋅α⋅i); (b) the tax value of local property tax deductions (τ ded ⋅τ p ); and (c) the tax that would have been paid on the equity invested in the home had it been invested elsewhere (τ int ⋅((1-α)⋅r+β)). 8 While the sum of these three terms represents total ordinary income tax benefits to owner occupiers under the current code, we hasten to emphasize that this does not imply that mortgage interest or local property tax deductions themselves are responsible for creating the subsidy. As noted above, the subsidy arises from the non-taxation of imputed rent. It simply is the case algebraically that the subsidy can be represented by the three terms on the right-hand side of equation (4). Looking at the deductions alone would underestimate the true subsidy.
Estimation Strategy and Data
The procedure for estimating the tax code-related subsidy to owner-occupiers is represented graphically in the tax schedule with three marginal tax brackets shown in Figure 1 . was above the standard deduction) and the tax liability to T 2 . Therefore, the tax savings for this family from the mortgage interest deduction is T 1 −T 2 .
Although in this example the mortgage interest deduction does not move the family into a lower tax bracket, the property tax deduction does. Beginning with TI equal to Y 2 −HMI, we can compute the tax savings from the property tax deduction as the tax bill with only the mortgage interest deduction, T 2 , minus the tax bill with both the mortgage interest and property tax deductions, T 3 . In this case, T 2 and T 3 span a kink in the tax schedule, but still account for the fact that the average tax rate is less than the marginal tax rate at Y 2 −HMI.
Finally, we compute the value of the non-taxation of the return on housing equity.
Because the return on housing equity is not included in TI, taxable income is measured at Y 1 instead of the greater amount Y 2 . The tax value of not including that income is measured as the change in tax between T 3 (the tax bill corresponding to a TI of Y 2 −HMI−T p ) and T 4 (the tax bill corresponding to an TI of Y 1 −HMI−T p ).
It is apparent from Figure 1 that the order in which the deductions are taken matters when the tax schedule is not linear. For example, T 1 −T 2 > T 3 −T 4 , even though HMI < Y 1 −Y 2 . After adding back the implicit return on housing equity, we compute the deductions in the following order: (a) tax savings from the mortgage interest deduction; (b) the tax savings associated with the property tax deduction; and (c) the savings from the return on housing equity being untaxed.
We have repeated the estimation using all six possible sequences in which the deductions can be taken. While the relative magnitudes of the categories change, the differences are minor.
We For each year in our data, the TAXSIM program incorporates all relevant federal and state tax law, including housing and property tax deductions.
To construct representative households to pass through the TAXSIM tax calculator, we start by computing the distribution of household income among homeowners at the tract level.
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For each tract, we divide the household income distribution into deciles and assign the median income for each decile to all the households in that category. Thus, the lowest-income one-tenth of the households are assumed to have an income equal to that of the fifth percentile for the tract, the next lowest-income tenth of the households are assigned an income equal to that of the 15 th percentile for the tract, and so forth.
We then map tract-level information on the distribution of house values, P H , to incomes by assigning to households in each decile of the income distribution the value corresponding to the same decile of the house value distribution. For example, we assume that the household in the 5 th percentile of the income distribution for the tract also owns the home in the 5 th percentile 9 All tax benefit figures reported in this paper are based on tract-level data that aggregates household income across its various sources.
of the housing price distribution for the same tract.
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The actual value of the tax benefits depends on certain demographic data that are likely to affect the number of exemptions and the overall amount of deductions. Tract level data that are available in each census year include the distribution of whether households are single, married, or single with children; the percentage of households with children; and the percentage of households over 65 years of age. We create a representative household for each possible combination of these characteristics and then compute the weighted average estimated tax, where the weights are the tract-level distributions of the demographic characteristics.
Unfortunately, the census data lack information on most non-housing categories of potential tax deductions. We compute mortgage interest, state tax, and property tax deductions, but we do not observe medical expenses, charitable giving, deductible interest (other than for a home mortgage), and several other miscellaneous categories. Two countervailing problems arise from underestimating possible deductions. First, we would be more likely to incorrectly assume the family does not itemize. This error would cause us to underestimate the tax value of the mortgage interest and property tax deductions since less would be deducted at the margin. On the other hand, undercounting deductions for itemizers could increase the tax value we do measure since the remaining deductions are applied against higher marginal tax rates.
Consequently, we impute missing tax deductions to our census data based on data from the Department of the Treasury's Statistics of Income (SOI) public use tax micro sample. A 10 This matching process presumes that owners and renters in a tract have identical income distributions.
Fortunately, our spatial results are robust to assuming an extreme case in which all the owners in a tract have a higher income than any of the renters, and houses are matched to owners so that the highest income owner owns the highest value house, the next highest income owner occupies the next highest valued house, and so forth. In reality, any sorting into houses by income would not be perfect, as is suggested by the data in O'Sullivan et al (1995) which matches tax returns and property tax assessments in California. Unfortunately, those data are no longer available. However, for the 1989 data we have tried using the mean income and house value in each tract, rather than the full distribution, and it does not make any qualitative difference to the spatial skewness we observe.
modified Heckman-style sample selection model is employed to correct for the selective observing of deductions only by itemizers.
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Following the procedure shown in Figure 1 , we augment the observed income by an estimate of how much higher the household's income would have been had they invested in an equivalently risky taxable asset rather than housing. First, we calculate the opportunity cost of the equity in one's home, or P H *((1-α)*r + β), where r is the riskless yield on seven-year Treasuries in the relevant census year: 9.47, 8.57, and 5.79 percent, respectively. Then we compute β: the risk premium for the whole house. 12 The estimates below assume that the expected equivalent-risk opportunity cost of investing in a house was equal to the geometric mean on the value-weighted S&P500 return (including dividends) over a certain time period.
For simplicity, we assume the relevant period always runs from the beginning of 1926 to the end of the census year (i.e., 1926-1979, 1926-1989, and 1926-1999) , yielding expected returns of 8.79, 10.13, and 11.22 percent, respectively. The risk premium is the difference between this yield and the risk-free yield. Thus, for 1989, we define β to be the 10.13 percent S&P500 return minus the 8.57 percent Treasury yield, for a premium of 1.56 percentage points. The opportunity cost of riskless equity and the risk premium are then added to income.
11 The interested reader should see the Appendix to Gyourko & Sinai (2003) for a detailed description of the procedure. The imputation results indicate that, absent the correction, we would have underestimated deductions and therefore the number of itemizers. This turns out to be important because the underestimation of itemizers was not random across space. In high house value and high income tax states such as California, not observing nonhousing deductions only infrequently caused us to miscategorize an owner family as a non-itemizer. Home mortgage interest, local property taxes, and state income taxes generally were sufficient to make California residents itemizers. This was not the case in many states with lower house values and lower state taxes. Hence, the imputation has an important effect on the measured spatial distribution of program benefits.
We estimate the value of the mortgage interest deduction by computing each tractdecile's tax value as the weighted average difference in tax bills with and without it. The mortgage interest deduction itself is defined as P H *α*i. Leverage ratios, α, vary by age and are computed from household data in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) closest in time to the relevant census year. A weighted average leverage for each tract was computed based on the tract's age distribution. 13 The mortgage interest rate, i, was calculated by taking an average across households in the same SCFs. From the 1983 SCF, which is the closest in time to 1979, we calculate the average mortgage rate was 10.21 percent. For 1989, the analogous rate was 9.56 percent, with a rate of 7.85 percent matched from the 1998 SCF to the 1999 census data.
The tax value of the mortgage interest deduction can differ from mortgage interest paid times the marginal tax rate for three reasons. First, only families that itemize on their tax returns receive any benefit on the margin from the deductibility of mortgage interest. Also, only the excess of the mortgage interest deduction plus other itemized deductions over the standard deduction has value for a taxpayer. Therefore, we would only multiply the portion of mortgage interest in excess of the standard deduction (after itemizing all other non-housing related deductions first) by the tax rate. Additionally, since the tax schedule is nonlinear, taking the mortgage interest deduction may lower the taxpayer's marginal and average tax rates.
The second component involves the value of the deduction of local property taxes.
Property tax payments themselves are defined as P H *τ p , where τ p is the average effective property tax rate. We were not able to find reliable estimates for this variable over time. (1987)). 15 The tax value of the deduction associated with these payments then is computed the same way as for the mortgage interest deduction.
The third term we estimate arises from the fact that the government does not tax as income the return home owners could have earned on their equity had they not invested in their homes. We calculate the reduction in tax liabilities that occurs when we remove the imputed income that we had added in the first step. This approach accounts for the possibility that a family might move into a higher marginal tax bracket if the return on its housing equity were taxed.
II. Results

Summary Statistics for the Nation
The national aggregate gross value to owners of housing-related ordinary income tax benefits, reported in the first panel of While it has long been understood that the subsidy is skewed in aggregate towards those with high incomes and high house values, much less is known about the spatial skewness of this aspect of the tax code. It is to that issue we now turn. We begin by documenting just how the tax subsidy to owner-occupied housing is skewed, describe how that skewness changes over time, and then investigate the factors driving any changes in the distribution of the subsidy of the mortgage. Results on the decomposition of the subsidy are available upon request. 17 Our estimates of the tax savings from the mortgage interest deduction alone are quite close to, but lower than, what we obtain by looking at actual tax return data. We cannot use the Statistics of Income data to compute the full tax expenditure because tax return data do not include information about house values, only itemized deductions. In addition, the SOI data do not report state of residence for taxpayers with AGI above a threshold, so our calculations using the SOI are also below the true figure. On the other hand, the Joint Committee on Taxation's projected tax expenditure on mortgage interest deductions for 1999 (these do not include state taxes) is slightly lower than what we calculate.
across states and metropolitan areas.
State-Level Results
While we will focus most of our analysis on the amount of tax benefits per owner, we begin with the most basic measure of the spatial distribution of the benefits: the aggregate benefit flow for each state by year. Not surprisingly, the most populous state, California, stands out in Table 2 shows that, as the national aggregate value of the subsidy increases, the additional benefits appear to be distributed in rough proportion to where they were already going. That is, while the aggregate benefit to California doubles between 1979 and 1999, so does the subsidy to small beneficiaries such as Georgia, Maryland, and North Carolina. Thus, the states tend to maintain their same relative standing, but the absolute (real) dollar difference between the highest and lowest recipient increases substantially.
Of course, changes in aggregate subsidy flows are heavily affected by population growth.
To net out differential increases in the number of homeowners, Figure 2 reports benefits scaled by the number of owners in each state in 1979 and 1999. 18 Even on a per owner basis, people in only a handful of states, often the most populous ones, reap substantially more from tax coderelated housing benefits than the typical owner nationally. For example, while California is no longer the extreme outlier it was in the aggregate data in Table 2 , it still is one of only seven states that received at least $6,000 per owner in 1979 and at least $8,000 per owner in 1999.
Overall, the per owner subsidies in the top few states are well over double those received by owners in the vast majority of states. Thus, while the Gini coefficients for the distribution of per owner benefits across states are relatively low in each decade (0.20 in 1979, 0.32 in 1989, and 0.25 in 1999) , it would not be accurate to consider the benefit distribution an especially egalitarian one in spatial terms.
Although the subsidy per owned unit has risen over time, the skewness has persisted at least since 1979. Benefit flows always are concentrated in the hands of owners in just a few states and the top three states have remained there for the last 20 years. However, the spatial distribution has changed some with owners in northeastern states doing better over time.
Of course, Figure 2 heterogeneity in the 1990s, and it was owners in the less populous western states of Colorado, Oregon, and Utah who experienced significantly greater than average increases that decade.
Owners in California and Hawaii received smaller than average benefit flow increases that decade.
As suggested in the introduction, many factors have changed over time that could influence the value of the tax benefits associated with owner-occupancy. The most obvious is tax rates themselves. Because owner-occupied housing is a true tax shelter in the sense that one can deduct expenses without declaring any income on the asset, a reduction in tax rates naturally lowers the value of the tax shelter. Figure 4 plots the 'average' marginal tax rate (state+federal) on housing deductions for 1979 and 1999, calculated using the Census data and the NBER's TAXSIM program. While marginal rates do differ across states, those differences have declined over time. Overall, marginal rates fell significantly during the 1980s and then rose modestly during the 1990s due to a series of tax reforms at the federal level.
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That aggregate benefits rose and benefits per owner did not decline on average between 1979 and 1989 indicates that other factors were changing to counterbalance the negative effect that an increase in the tax price of housing would have on the value of the benefit. In addition, the fact that most of the important tax changes were at the federal level may help explain why the nature of the spatial distribution across states was not affected very much.
Other components of the subsidy were changing, of course, and house prices in particular. Figure 5 Of course, there are other factors at work, including the rising return in equity markets which raises the value of the tax shield on home equity in our calculations. While a detailed decomposition analysis of changes in the tax benefit over time is beyond the scope of this study, the data show that the factors that do change did so in a largely offsetting fashion with respect to the spatial distribution across states in the 1980s. The rise in aggregate and per owner benefits in the 1990s probably reflects a growing share of households that are owners, rising real house prices, and increasing tax rates. On net, the spatial distribution of benefits across states is fairly skewed in each census year, with very few states experiencing significant changes in their relative status. Whether this holds at the metropolitan area level is the subject of the following subsection.
Between-Metropolitan Area Results
In this subsection, we disaggregate the data further to examine subsidy flows at the metropolitan area level and find that the distribution of housing benefits are more skewed than at the state level, and that skewness is increasing over time. Results are computed for 380 areas that were identifiable Census Core-Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs).
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Aggregate benefit flows at the CBSA level, which are reported for selected areas in the Appendix, document how extremely spatially targeted are the overall benefit flows. The vast majority of metropolitan areas receive a relatively modest benefit flow, while a relatively small number of areas receive very large aggregate benefit flows.
This form of spatial skewness also has increased over time at the metropolitan area level. CBSAs are Census's new (2003) county-based definition of metropolitan areas. We apply the same definition in each of the three Census files, realizing of course that the economic relationship between the counties is weaker earlier in previous decades. By construction, a CBSA must contain at least one urban area of 10,000 or more population. The county (or counties) "in which at least 50 percent of the population resides within urban areas of 10,000 or more population, or that contain at least 5,000 people residing within a single urban area of 10,000 or more population, is identified as a "central county"" and is included in the CBSA. Additional "outlying counties" are included in the CBSA if they meet specified requirements of commuting to or from the central counties.
decades progress is an indication that spatial skewness, net of population changes, has been on the rise. This is made even more clear in Tables 3 and 4, areas. 24 The differentials are narrower on a per household basis, with households in the top twenty areas having benefit flows that are from 2 to 4 times those in the bottom twenty areas.
While differences in ownership rates -which are lower in the top subsidy areas -do account for some of the gap between the top and bottom recipient areas, the disparity still is large even on a per household basis. The top twenty areas in terms of benefits per owner are virtually unchanged by restricting the sample to more populous areas containing more than the median number of households. This is not the case among the bottom twenty areas. If the full sample of 380 CBSAs is used, Texas is even more overrepresented as it contains a large number of less populous metropolitan areas. 24 These ranges were determined by computing the ratio of benefit per owner in the top-ranked area versus the bottom ranked area, from the second-to-highest ranked area versus the second-to-lowest ranked area, and so forth. In sum, the spatial skewness of benefit flows per owner has grown over time, with the top areas now receiving very large multiples of the subsidy received by the bottom areas.
Geographically, this skewness now is a bi-coastal phenomenon, with metropolitan areas spanning the state of California and between New York and Boston dominating the top 20 benefit per owner rankings. Still, there is strong persistence over time in the areas that receive the most benefit, and their share of the total has been rising.
Because the most important tax code changes tend to have occurred at the federal level, plots of tax rates and tax rate changes at the metropolitan level are not particularly helpful in increasing our understanding of these results. In contrast, examining house prices over time at the local level is very illuminating. For example, Figure 8 's plots of the distribution of mean house values by metropolitan area over time look strikingly similar to the distributions of benefits per owner in Figure 7 . While it is the case that incomes and tax rates are somewhat higher in coastal metropolitan areas, those differences are not nearly as pronounced as for house values. Thus, it is rising real house prices, especially in key coastal metropolitan areas, augmented by generally higher tax rates in those areas, that is increasing the absolute and relative benefits flowing to their owners. Because how the housing is financed has only a second-order effect (through itemization) on the value of the subsidy, it is not necessary for households to refinance their houses to increase their subsidies. Since higher prices reflect higher implicit rental value, if housing were treated symmetrically tax revenues would increase with house prices.
III. Conclusions
Estimating the tax subsidy to home owners by comparing the taxes they now pay with those they would pay if they faced neutral tax treatment -like landlords, in our example -shows a substantial increase in the value of the tax benefit over time. While some of the aggregate increase clearly is due to a rise in the number of homeowners, benefits per owner are about 20 percent higher in 1999 than they were in 1979 at the national level. This is particularly interesting given that it occurs despite marginal and average tax rates falling over the past two decades. The evidence suggests that rising house prices, especially in key coastal areas and in certain regions of the country, can help account for the fact that the value of the subsidy has risen even though the tax subsidy per dollar of housing has declined.
Spatially, we demonstrate that the subsidy flows disproportionately to owners in a relatively small number of states-California, especially. Spatial skewness is even more extreme at the metropolitan level, and the data indicate that skewness there has increased over time, though the top recipient areas tend to remain so. Rising house prices in certain coastal metropolitan areas appear to play a large role in explaining this phenomenon.
While the magnitude and skewness of the subsidy are striking, one note of caution is in order when interpreting these results. While it may appear that current homeowners in some parts of the country reap a large tax subsidy, their house prices may be higher to reflect it. That is, the after-tax annual cost of housing in high-subsidy areas may not differ from low-subsidy areas by the full amount of the tax benefit. In the extreme case, if house prices have fully capitalized the benefit, current homeowners are no better off on a flow basis.
Computing the incidence of the tax subsidy to owner-occupied housing -the degree to which the subsidy shows up in higher house prices rather than as a reduced flow cost of homeownership -is beyond the scope of this paper. In addition, there is no consensus in the economics literature on the answer: estimates range from full capitalization to very low capitalization. 26 Unfortunately, where the incidence lies has crucial implications for public policy. For example, it would be easy to jump to the conclusion that, due to the spatial inequity of the tax subsidy to owner occupied housing, policymakers should restructure the tax benefit.
But if a reduction in benefit is capitalized into house prices, current homeowners may experience a loss of wealth. If those homeowners had been the beneficiaries of the rise in house prices when the tax subsidy increased, such a reduction in asset value might be equitable. However, it is quite likely that current homeowners purchased their house with the tax benefit already capitalized into the price, paying more on the expectation of future subsidies.
The degree of the capitalization of the subsidy into house prices also is unlikely to be spatially neutral. In places where land is in short supply, an increase in demand for housing is likely to show up more in house prices than it would in cities where it is easy to add more housing stock. That housing demand can be created by local economic factors or the subsidy to owner occupied housing. Thus, for the same underlying economic reasons, places where the tax benefit is the greatest are places with high land prices and also places where the subsidy is more likely to be capitalized into the house price. While we cannot say how much of any reduction in the tax benefit would show up as lower house prices, it seems likely that a larger fraction (of a larger benefit) would be reflected in house prices in the high benefit areas. 26 For examples, see Bruce and Holtz-Eakin (1999) and Capozza, Green, and Hendershott (1996) . Research, Vol. 9 no. 2 (1998 ): 179-199. Geolytics, Inc. CensusCD 1980 , 1990 , 2000 , census tract-level data, East Brunswick, NJ. Gravelle, Jane. "Whither Depreciation?" National Tax Journal, Vol. 54, no. 3 (2001 1999 -2003 ," (Washington, DC) U.S. Government Printing Office, December 14, 1998. 400,000 500,000 600,000 700,000
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